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Abstract
This paper presents an international capital liberalization model by allowing govern-
ments choose either to liberalize the domestic market for capital inﬂow or not. We examine
the properties of the equilibrium in the export subsidization warfare when a single country
opens the market for inward direct investment. We clarify that international coordination
is not always necessary in the capital liberalization game. If the cost asymmetry of the
two exporting ﬁrms is large enough, mutual capital restriction makes world welfare better
oﬀ.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: F12, F13
Keywords: strategic export policy, location choice, inward direct investment, capital
liberalization
1 Introduction
The theory of strategic export subsidization has made a remarkable progress towards the end
of the 20th century in international trade since the pioneering work by Brander and Spencer
(1985). Their main contribution lies in that export subsidization may enhance the exporting
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country’s welfare in imperfect competition in the absence of interdependence with the other
sectors in the economy. Their results soon led to the dispute on strategic subsidy theory.
Markusen and Venables (1988) indicated that the rent shifting eﬀects of export subsidy
become weak when Cournot markets are integrated. Under the same assumption of integrated
markets, Horstman and Markusen (1986) showed that welfare enhancing export subsidy may
bring the ineﬃcient entry. Their result is also challenged by Eaton and Grossman (1986);
the so-called rent extraction eﬀects of export subsidization hinges on the market structure
of quantity competition a` la Cournot with zero conjectural variations. The optimal export
subsidy may become negative with Bertrand-Competition. Another challenge comes from re-
laxing the assumption of entry restrictions. As for the lack of information for the government,
it is also pointed out that free trade is the best policy instead of strategic subsidy by Dixit
and Grossman (1986) when there are more than two oligopolistic export industries. However
insofar as we are conﬁned into the original Brander and Spencer (1985) framework and the
long-run view of competition according to Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), one cannot neglect
an exporting country’s incentive to subsidize its own domestic ﬁrms.
However such a view of export subsidization warfare has recently been challenged by
Janeba (1998) once we take into account the ﬁrms’ opportunity of relocating their production
bases. When the ﬁrms in the exporting countries can relocate their production bases, each
exporting country is restrained from subsidization, for such high rates of subsidies also beneﬁt
the foreign ﬁrms relocating to the home country, leading to the outﬂow of rent. Janeba (1998)
showed that the resulting equilibrium entails free trade, i.e., zero export subsidies, and that
mutual capital liberalization dominates mutual capital restriction. 1
However the previous studies have not explored the problem to a full extent, for the cost
conditions are the same between the two exporting countries and each country’s capital lib-
eralization policy is exogenously given. As we demonstrate in this paper, once we endogenize
the governments’ decision on capital liberalization policy under asymmetric cost conditions,
many results have diﬀerent implications.
1Peralta, Wauthy, and van Ypersele (2006) examined the ﬁrms’ location choice in view of the governments’
policy on corporate tax and the proﬁt shifting control. Barros and Cabral (2000) analyzed subsidy competition
to attract FDI from the third country by considering domestic employment gains.
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The rest of our paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we build up the four-stage
model of capital liberalization in which the governments of the exporting countries decide on
its capital liberalization at the ﬁrst stage. In section 3, we brieﬂy summarize the standard
strategic subsidization incentive in Brander and Spencer (1985) as the ﬁrst subgame in the
capital liberalization game. In section 4, we review the eﬀects of relocatability of the ﬁrms
following Janeba (1998) as the second subgame. In section 5, we discuss the subgame in
which one exporting country liberalizes capital. In section 6, based on the discussion on
the subgames, we explore the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of our capital liberalization
game and the implications of non-cooperative decisions by the exporting countries on the
world welfare. Lastly, in section 7, some concluding remarks are summed up.
2 Model Setup
2.1 Structure of the Economies
We construct our model under the framework of Brander and Spencer (1985)(the BS model
hereafter). Consider a world consisting of three countries, 1, 2 and 3. There is a ﬁrm residing
in each of countries 1 and 2, producing a homogeneous product, and selling to country 3,
which does not produce but only consume the product in question.
Let xi denote the output produced by ﬁrm i, ci its unit cost of production, and si the
unit export subsidy provided by country i’s government. Let p denote the market price in
country 3, an importing country, X(= x1 + x2) its total consumption. The inverse import
demand function in the third country is assumed to be linear throughout the paper:2
p = a−X
where a is a positive constant and a > ci (i = 1, 2). 3
2The assumption of linear demand can be relaxed easily. See Kiyono and Wei (2002).
3This assumption ensures ﬁrm i to have an incentive to produce even as a monopolist, for at the output
level 0 under monopoly the marginal revenue is a and its marginal cost is ci.
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2.2 Structure of the Capital Liberalization Game
The game of our interest, which we call the capital liberalization game, incorporates the
following four stages of decision.
1st stage The governments of both exporting countries decide simultaneously on whether
to close or open the domestic market for capital inﬂow from abroad.
2nd stage After observing the decisions on capital liberalization, the governments of both
exporting countries simultaneously decide on the production (=export) subsidy rate.
3rd stage If at least one country is ready to liberalize capital, the ﬁrms in the other countries
decide simultaneously where to locate their production plants, either in country 1 or 2.
If both countries have decided to refuse capital inﬂow, there follows the next stage.
4th stage After observing the locations of production plants, both ﬁrms simultaneously
decide on how much to produce and export to country 3.
Each government has two policy instruments: (i) the capital liberalization policy σi(i =
1, 2) ∈ {C,O} where C represents the policy of closing the domestic market against capital
inﬂow from abroad and O the policy of opening the market, and (ii) the production sub-
sidization policy si(i = 1, 2) where si ≥ 0 denote the production subsidy per unit output.
In view of the ﬁrst-stage decisions for σi, the present game can be divided into four sub-
games as shown in Table 1. A subgame associated with capital liberalization policy proﬁle
(σ1,σ2) (∈ {C,O}× {C,O}) is called subgame σ1σ2. The payoﬀ W σ1σ2(i = 1, 2) in the tablei
denotes the equilibrium welfare of country i for subgame σ1σ2. In terms of this terminol-
ogy, subgame CC is the BS model in which both countries close their markets to restrain
capital mobility, while subgame OO is the one analyzed by Janeba (1998) in which both coun-
tries are ready to liberalize capital. Therefore our model incorporates all the features of the
previous studies and discuss endogenous determination of each exporting country’s capital
liberalization policies.
For the succeeding discussion, let us ﬁrst summarize the results of Brander and Spencer
(1985) and Janeba (1998) as well as some other derivations necessary for our analysis.
4
Table 1: Payoﬀ Matrix for the Subgames
Country 2
σ2 = C σ2 = O
Country 1 σ1 = C
σ1 = O
WCC ,WCC WCO,WCO1 2 1 2
WOC ,WOC WOO,WOO1 2 1 2
3 The BS Model as Subgame CC
Subgame CC, i.e., the BS model explores governments’ incentives to subsidize the own ex-
porting ﬁrms when each ﬁrm cannot relocate abroad. Given the subsidy rate (si, sj), each
ﬁrm’s equilibrium output and proﬁt in the market performance are expressed as below:
x∗i (si, sj) =
βi + 2si − sj (1)
3
πi
∗(si, sj) =
(βi + 2si − sj)2 (2)
9
where βi := a − 2ci + cj ≥ 0(i, j = 1, 2; j =6 i) for ﬁrm i’s output to be non-negative under
duopoly. Throughout the rest of our paper, we use β1/β2 as the indicator of the relative cost
of ﬁrm 2 over ﬁrm 1, since β1/β2 = 1 for c1 = c2 and β1/β2 is increasing in c2 and decreasing
in c1.
Without ﬁrms’ mobility, each exporting country’s welfare is given by:
µ
(βi + 2si − sj)(βi − si − sj)∂
Wi(si, sj) := π∗(si, sj)− six∗(si, sj) = 9 . (3)i i
Each country’s reaction function denoted by Ri(sj) is deﬁned as a solution for maximizing
net surplus in (3):4
1
Ri(sj) := argmaxWi(si, sj) = 4
(βi − sj) (4){si}
4It is straightforward to verify:
(i) Wi(si, sj) is strictly concave in si in view of (3), so that the standard second-order condition for welfare
maximization is satisﬁed.
(ii) |Ri0(sj)| < 1 in view of (4), which assures stability of the non-cooperative equilibrium for the export
subsidization game.
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Country i’s reaction curve associated with (4) is shown by the curve RiRi
0 in Figure 1.
CCThe intersection labeled ECC represents the equilibrium subsidy rate of country i, si which
is given by:
sCCi =
4βi
15
− βj (i, j = 1, 2; j =6 i). (5)
The associated equilibrium welfare of each exporting country is expressed by
WCC := Wi
°
sCC , sCC
¢
= 2
µ
4βi − βj∂2 (i, j = 1, 2; j = i). (6)i 1 2 15 6
s2
s1
sˆ2
0
45◦
R2
R′2
R′1
R1
sˆ1sCC1
sCC2
ECC
Figure 1: Export Subsidization Warfare Equilibrium in Subgame CC (the BS Model)
Depending on the parameters governing our model, it is possible to have a monopoly
outcome. However, since the monopoly case is beyond the scope of our paper, we assume
that the outputs of both ﬁrms are non-negative at the equilibrium, i.e., x∗(sCC , sCC) ≥ 0. 5i 1 2
This condition is equivalent to the following assumption.
1
Assumption 1 β1/β2 is satisﬁed as 4
≤ β1/β2 ≤ 4.
CC 4βi−βj CC CC 2(4βi−βj)5Substituting si = 15 into (1) yields x
∗
i
°
s1 , s2
¢
= 15 .
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Thus the equilibrium subsidy of each country sCCi (i = 1, 2) is non-negative which means
that each country has a positive incentive to subsidize its own exports. For the later analysis,
we found that there exists a unique rate of subsidy sˆi in each country i such that sˆi :=
Ri(sˆi) = βi/5. We further have the following lemma:
Lemma 1 For sˆi
≥
:= β5
i
¥
, there holds s < Ri (s) if and only if s < sˆi (i = 1, 2).
sˆi deﬁned in the above lemma is shown in Figure 1, which is determined by the intersection
of the reaction curve RiRi
0 and 45◦ Line. In subgame CC, each country has an incentive to
set relatively high subsidy rates due to the policy of banning inward direct investment from
abroad. As we will discuss later otherwise, i.e., when allowing capital inﬂow, the governments
lose the incentive to choose high subsidy rates, for such high subsidy rates lead the rent run
out to the foreign ﬁrm having moved into the domestic market.
4 Subgame OO –Mutual Capital Liberalization
Subgame OO is the game explored by Janeba (1998), which is an extension of the BS model
to the case in which both exporting countries liberalize capital, i.e., the two exporting ﬁrms
can freely choose their location for production. The analysis makes sense only when both
countries have already decided to accept inward direct investment from abroad. In our paper,
we impose the following assumption as in Janeba (1998).
Assumption 2 When a ﬁrm can relocate its production plant between countries 1 and 2, it
must be subject to the following constraints.
(i) The ﬁrm cannot change the location of the headquarter for management.
(ii) The ﬁrm cannot undertake production simultaneously in both countries.
(iii) The same total production cost function is available whether in country 1 or 2.
(iv) The ﬁrm stays in the own country when the two countries set the same subsidy rates.6
6We impose the same tie-breaking rule for zero transportation cost as in Janeba (1998). Without this rule,
the equilibria will involve more complicated mixed strategies.
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When both exporting countries have liberalized capital, the ﬁrm’s strategic location choice
depends on the subsidy rates chosen by the two countries, and the country oﬀering a higher
subsidy (or imposing a lower tax) can attract the both ﬁrms but suﬀer from the foreign rent
outﬂow. Taxation can restrain this rent outﬂow but induces both ﬁrms to go abroad, leading
to a loss of tax revenue. Therefore there can never exist an equilibrium with either strictly
positive or negative subsidies. The strategic subsidization incentive of each country leads the
equilibrium subsidy rates equal to zero for both exporting countries. Janeba (1998)’s result
elucidates how the mutual capital liberalization by both countries (or the relocatability of
both ﬁrms) aﬀects the government’s subsidization incentives.
Proposition 1 (Janeba (1998)) When the two exporting countries open their domestic
markets allowing foreign capital inﬂow, the equilibrium subsidy of each exporting country
becomes equal to zero.
The associated equilibrium welfare of each exporting country is expressed by
β2
Wi
OO := i (i = 1, 2) . (7)
9
Comparing the above equilibrium welfare in subgame OO with that in subgame CC in
(6), we obtain:
WCC −WOO 7βi
2 − 16βiβj + 2βj2= .i i 225
So that there holds the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Mutual capital liberalization makes
i) exporting country 1 strictly better oﬀ for ββ
1
2
∈
≥
8−5
7
√
2 , 8+57
√
2
¥
, and exporting country 2
strictly better oﬀ ββ
1
2
∈
≥
8−5
2
√
2 , 8+52
√
2
¥
, 7 and thus
ii) both exporting countries strictly better oﬀ for ββ
1
2
∈
≥
8−5
2
√
2 , 8+57
√
2
¥
.
7Use was made of the condition that exporting country i is made strictly better oﬀ if β
β
j
i ∈
≥
8−5
7
√
2 , 8+57
√
2
¥
where i, j = 1, 2 and j = i.6
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Janeba (1998) demonstrates that the exporting countries are better oﬀ with mutual capital
liberalization than when both ban inward direct investment. However his result depends on
the assumption that both exporting countries have the same cost conditions, i.e., β1/β2 = 1.
When the cost conditions diﬀer suﬃciently to have β1/β2 ∈/
≥
8−5
2
√
2 , 8+57
√
2
¥
, both exporting
countries will be worse oﬀ by mutual capital liberalization.
5 Subgames OC, CO – Unilateral Capital Liberalization
Based on the above results of subgames CC and OO, we next explore the other two subgames
in which only one exporting country liberalizes capital, i.e., subgames OC and CO. Since the
two subgames are symmetric, we focus our attention on the analysis for subgame OC.
We have to explore the properties of each country’s reaction curve as well as its welfare
function (i.e., the payoﬀ) so as to obtain the equilibrium. We ﬁrst deal with country 1’s best
response.
5.1 Country 1’s Best Response
Since country 1’s choice of subsidy rate aﬀects ﬁrm 2’s relocation incentive, we employ the
following strategy to elucidate country 1’s best-response subsidy policy given s2.
1st step Characterize country 1’s optimal subsidy given either (i) the policy of attracting
ﬁrm 2 to the own country (hereafter the attracting policy) or (ii) the policy of refusing
ﬁrm 2 (hereafter the non-attracting policy).
2nd step Choose the policy realizing the higher welfare between the attracting policy and
the non-attracting policy.
9
5.1.1 Best Attracting Policy for Country 1
Let us consider country 1’s optimal decision on the subsidy rate when it succeeds in attracting
ﬁrm 2 given s2. Its associated welfare denoted as V1a can be expressed as:√
(β1 + s1)2 (β1 + β2 + 2s1)
!
V1
a (s1) := W1 (s1, s1)− s1x2∗ (s1, s1) = 9 − s1 3 . (8)
aDeﬁne s1 as country 1’s optimal subsidy rate for maximizing V1a(s1) when ﬁrm 2 moves
its production plant to country 1 and no longer relocates:
sa1 := argmaxV
a (s1) = −(β1 + 3β2) < 0. (9){s1} 1 10
That is, since ﬁrm 2 never moves out of country 1, it is the best for country 1 to tax the
duopoly rent of ﬁrm 2 through taxation. Thus country 1’s best-response subsidy given its
apolicy of attracting ﬁrm 2, denoted by Γa1 (s2) is s1 when s2 < sa1 and s2 + ≤ otherwise. The
best-response subsidy and the corresponding maximized welfare level expressed by V¯1a(s2) :=
sups1{V1a(s1)|s1 > s2} are shown in Table 2.
5.1.2 Best Non-Attracting Policy for Country 1
Once country 1 bans any inward direct investment from abroad, its welfare is just the same
as in the benchmark case of the BS model, i.e., W1 (s1, s2) and its best-response subsidy
R1(s2) = β1−s2 . However as shown in Lemma 1, this best-response subsidy of country 14
exceeds country 2’s subsidy rate if s2 < sˆ1, so that country 1 is forced to accept ﬁrm 2. Given
its non-attracting policy, country 1 cannot then employ R1(s2) but must match s2 for its
welfare maximization.
Therefore, country 1’s best-response subsidy against s2 under the non-attracting pol-
icy, denoted by Γn1 (s2) and the associated maximized welfare level denoted by V¯1n(s2) :=
maxs1{W1(s1, s2)|s1 ≤ s2} are summarized in Table 2. 8
There is one remark concerning the equilibrium outputs of the ﬁrms here. In view of (1),
8In the table, ε(> 0) represents a suﬃciently small positive number.
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Table 2: Best-Response Subsidy and Welfare for Country 1
Best Attracting Policy Best Non-attracting Policy
Range
of s2
Best response
subsidy Γa1(s2)
Maximum
payoﬀ V¯ a1 (s2)
Range
of s2
Best response
subsidy Γn1 (s2)
Maximum
payoﬀ V¯ n1 (s2)
s2 < sa1 s
a
1
−5sa21 −(β1+3β2)sa1+β21
9 s2 < sˆ1 s2
(β1−2s2)(β1+s2)
9
s2 ≥ sa1 s2 + ε −5s
2
2−(β1+3β2)s2+β21
9 s2 ≥ sˆ1 β1−s24 (β1−s2)
2
8
(9) and the results in Table 2, duopoly obtains only if there holds β1/β2 ≥ 1/3.9 For the
reference in the succeeding discussion, we sum up in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 When ﬁrm 2 locates its plant in country 1, the equilibrium outputs of both ﬁrms
are non-negative only if β1/β2 ≥ 1/3.
5.1.3 Policy Switch for Country 1
A1
A0
A2
A3
N ′1
N1
N2
N3
B
0 β1sa1 sˆ1
s2
Country 1's welfare
N ′3
Figure 2: Country 1’s Payoﬀ Curve
Figure 2 shows the associated maximized welfare for country 1 summarized in Table 2.10
The curve labeled A1A2BA3 illustrates the welfare under the attracting policy, while the
curve labeled N10BN2N3 shows the welfare under the non-attracting policy.11
a a9We get x∗1(s1 , s1) =
3β1−β2 ≥ 0 if β1/β2 ≥ 1/3.10
10We set β1 = 1 and β2 = 6
7 when drawing the welfare curves in Figure 2.
11The curve N1
0BN2N3
0 associated with the function W1 = (β1−2s29
)(β1+s2) is tangent to the curve N1N2N3
associated with W1 =
(β1−
8
s2)
2
at s2 = sˆ1 = β1/5. This is not a coincidence, for the best-response subsidy
rates are the same both under the attracting and non-attracting policies.
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Given country 2’s subsidy s2, country 1 can choose whether to accept ﬁrm 2’s direct
investment by strategically selecting its own subsidy rate. As shown in Figure 2, the two
welfare curves for the two policies intersect at s2 = 0, for country 1 cannot extract ﬁrm 2’s
rent through zero subsidy rate. One can also prove that under Assumption 1 the curve N10B
is always below the curve A1A2B assuring a unique intersection of the two payoﬀ curves at
s2 = 0.
Therefore, country 1’s best-response subsidy against s2 when taking into account its choice
between the attracting and non-attracting policies, denoted by Γ1(s2), is summarized in the
following lemma.
Lemma 3 Country 1’s best response Γ1(s2) should satisfy
Γ (s2) for s2 < 0a1
Γ1(s2) = .
Γ (s2) for s2 ≥ 0 n1
Or more precisely, it can be expressed as

for s2 ∈ (−1, sa1)as1
afor s2 ∈ [s1, 0)s2 + ε
Γ1(s2) = 0 for s2 = 0
s2 for s2 ∈ (0, sˆ1]
R1(s2) for s2 ∈ (sˆ1,+1)
where ε(> 0) is a suﬃciently small positive number.
Country 1’s reaction curve is illustrated by the mixture of the thick real and broken curves,
i.e., the curve labeled A1A2A3R1 in Figure 3.
5.2 Country 2’s Best Response
We turn to derive country 2’s best response as in the previous discussion for country 1’s.
12
45◦
s2
s1
sa1
sa1
sˆ1
R1
R′1
A1
A2
A3
?
?
?
1
Figure 3: Country 1’s Reaction Curve
5.2.1 Best Attracting Policy for Country 2
First consider the case in which given s1 country 2 succeeds in attracting (or more precisely
keeping) ﬁrm 2 at home. The welfare is just the same as in the benchmark case of the BS
model, i.e., W2(s1, s2). The best-response subsidy is also given by the reaction function (4),
i.e., R2(s1). Likewise, as stated in Lemma 1, when s1 is suﬃciently high and greater than sˆ2,
country 2’s best-response subsidy R2(s1) becomes lower than country 1’s subsidy s1. In this
case, country 2 is forced to match its subsidy with country 1’s so as to keep ﬁrm 2 at home.
Given country 2’s attracting policy, its best-response subsidy rate denoted by Γa2(s1) and
the maximized welfare denoted by ¯ (s1) are summarized in Table 3.aV2
5.2.2 Best Non-Attracting Policy for Country 2
Next we consider the case in which country 2 has decided not to attract ﬁrm 2 (or more
precisely decided to keep ﬁrm 2 away from home). In this case, the subsidy rate chosen by
country 2 does not aﬀect the market outcomes at all. Thus its maximized welfare denoted
by V¯2 (s1) depends only on country 1’s subsidy rate and exactly equals to ﬁrm 2’s proﬁt, i.e.,n
π2
∗(s1, s1).
Since country 2 succeeds in keeping ﬁrm 2 away from home only with s2 < s1, its best-
response subsidy against s1 given the non-attracting policy, denoted by Γn2 (s1), is given by
13
(−1, s1) as shown in Table 3.
Table 3: Best-Response Subsidy and Welfare for Country 2
Best Attracting Policy Best Non-attracting Policy
Range
of s1
Best response
subsidy Γa2(s1)
Maximum
payoﬀ V¯ a2 (s1)
Range
of s1
Best response
subsidy Γn2 (s1)
Maximum
payoﬀ V¯ n2 (s1)
s1 < sˆ2
β2−s1
4
(β2−s1)2
8
all s1 (−1, s1) (β2+s1)
2
9s1 ≥ sˆ2 s1 (β2−2s1)(β2+s1)9
5.2.3 Policy Switch for Country 2
In Figure 4, the curve named A1BCA02 shows the maximized welfare of country 2 given the
attracting policy and the curve named N1BN2 the maximized welfare of country 2 given the
non-attracting policy.
N1
N2A1
A′1
A2
A′2
B
C
s1
s¯1 sˆ20
Country 2's welfare
Figure 4: Country 2’s Payoﬀ Curve
Country 2 chooses the attracting policy only when there holds
V¯2
a(s1) > V¯2
n(s1). (10)
In view of the results in Table 3, we have to deal with the following two cases for solving
the above inequality.
14
Case 1: When s1 ≥ sˆ2, (10) can be rewritten as below.
(β2 − 2s1)(β2 + s1) > (β2 + s1)
2
, or 0 > (β2 + s1) s1.9 9
The above inequality never holds for s1 > sˆ2(> 0), so that it is better for country 2 to employ
the non-attracting policy, i.e., (−1, s1).
Case 2: When s1 < sˆ2, (10) now becomes
2(β2 − s1)2 > (β2 + s1)
2
, or s1 − 34β2s1 + β22 > 0.8 9
The inequality holds for s1 <
°
17− 12√2¢β2 or s1 > °17 + 12√2¢β2. Since there holds
β2 ¯(0 <)
°
17− 12√2¢β2 < sˆ2 = < °17 + 12√2¢β2, we conclude that5 (s1) > V¯2 (s1) holdsa nV2
for s1 <
°
17− 12√2¢β2. In the following discussion, we deﬁne:
s¯1 :=
≥
17− 12√2
¥
β2 > 0 (11)
for brevity of exposition.12 The best-response subsidization policy of country 2 can be sum-
marized as follows. for s1 < s¯1= Γ (s1) (= R2(s1))a2
Γ2(s1)
a
2 (s¯1)} ∪ {Γn2 (s¯1)} (= {R2 (s¯1)} ∪ (−1, s¯1)) for s1 = s¯1= {Γ
= Γn2 (s1) (= (−1, s1)) otherwise
Therefore country 2’s best response curve is depicted as the segment R2D and the shaded
region excluding the dotted boundary in Figure 5 and 6.
5.3 Equilibrium under Unilateral Capital Liberalization
The results in the previous sections imply several possible equilibria. But they are roughly
classiﬁed into the following two cases.
12¯ 17s1/β2 = 17− 12
√
2 ∝ 12 −
√
2 > 0.
15
45◦
?
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R′1
R1
R′2
R2
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E
s2
s10
sa1
?
s¯1
D
sB1
1
Figure 5: Pure Strategy Equilibrium when β1/β2 ≤ βmix
45◦
?
?
R′1
R1
R′2
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s¯1
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D
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1
Figure 6: Mixed Strategy Equilibrium when β1/β2 > βmix
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• Case I: Nash equilibrium in pure-strategy (See Figure 5)
• Case II: Nash equilibrium in mixed-strategy (See Figure 6)
Comparison of the two ﬁgures indicates that the pure-strategy equilibrium is possible only
CCif there holds s¯1 ≥ s1 , i.e., β1 ≤ βmix
°
:= 64− 45√2 ∈ (0, 1)¢ 13. As in Krishna (1989), it isβ2
straightforward to prove the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Depending on the value β1/β2, there emerge two types of equilibria for sub-
game OC as follows.
(i) For β1/β2 ≤ βmix
°
:= 64− 45√2 ∈ (0, 1)¢, there realizes the same pure-strategy equilib-
rium as in subgame CC.
(ii) Otherwise, there realizes a mixed-strategy equilibrium where country 1 (having employed
O) chooses s¯1 with probability unity and country 2 (having employed C) randomizes over
R2(s¯1) and (−1, s¯1).
Let ρ represent the equilibrium probability of country 2 choosing R2 (s¯1) and 1 − ρ the
probability of its choosing other subsidy rates s2 smaller than s¯1. The equilibrium expected
welfare of country 1 in the mixed-strategy is denoted as W1
OCm(s1) where the superscript
Cm represent that country 2 employs a mixed strategy on export subsidies. The equilibrium
probability of country 2 choosing R2(s¯1) can be obtained by analyzing country 1’s optimization
13It is straightforward to derive
sCC s1 =
4β2
Ωµ
β1
∂ ≥
64− 45√2
¥æ
.1 − ¯ 15 β2 −
One should also note βmix > 1/3, as shown by
βmix − 1 = (64− 45
√
2)− 1 191− 135√2 ∝ 191 √2 > 0.
3 3
∝
135
−
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behavior. Given ρ, the expected welfare of country 1 choosing s1 is given by
WOCm(s1) = ρW1 (s1, R2(s¯1)) + (1− ρ)V a(s1)1 1
=
ρ
(β1 + 2s1 −R2(s¯1)) (β1 − s1 −R2(s¯1))9 · µ
(β1 + s1)2 (β1 + β2 + 2s1)
∂
+ (1− ρ)
9
− s1 3 ,
where use was made of (3) and (8). Diﬀerentiation with respect to s1 yields
9
dW1
OCm(s1) = ρ (β1 − 4s1 −R2(s¯1)) + (1− ρ) (−β1 − 3β2 − 10s1) .
ds1
1Since there must hold lims1→¯
dWOCm (s1) = 0, ρ should satisfys1 ds1
4 (β1 + 3β2 + 10s¯1) β + 173− 120
√
2
ρ =
8β1 + 11β2 + 25s¯1
=
2β + 109− 75√2 , (12)
by virtue of s¯1 = (17− 12
√
2)β2. Using ρ in (12), the expected welfare of each country at the
mixed-strategy equilibrium is given by:
WOCm := ρW1 (s¯1, R2(s¯1)) + (1− ρ)V a(s¯1), (13)1 1
W2
OCm := W2 (s¯1, R2 (s¯1)) =
(β2 + s¯1)2 . (14)
9
To examine the welfare implication for the production relocatability of ﬁrm 2, we should
compare the above equilibrium welfare in mixed-strategy with those in pure-strategy, i.e.,
W1
OCm vs. W1CC and W2
OCm vs. W2CC .
For country 2, it is easy to see that country 2’s welfare is higher at point D than at point
E along its best-response curve R2R20 in Figure 6. Thus W2CC < W2
OCm holds. For country
1, it can be demonstrated as follows. By using (13), country 1’s expected welfare at the
mixed-strategy equilibrium yields:
WOCm
(4β1 − β2 − 3s¯1)(4β1 − β2 + 9s¯1) β12 − s¯1(β1 + 3β2)− 5s¯12= ρ
144
+ (1− ρ)
9
,1
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where ρ =
4(β1 + 3β2 + 10s¯1) and s¯1 = (3− 2
√
2)2β2. Its comparison with WCC yields:8β1 + 11β2 + 25s¯1 1
WCC −WOCm
µ
4β1 − β2∂2 (4β1 − β2 − 3s¯1)(4β1 − β2 + 9s¯1)
1 1 = 2 15
− ρ
144
− (1− ρ)β1
2 − s¯1(β1 + 3β2)− 5s¯12 .
9
WCC −WOCm = 0 is isomorphic to a complicated cubic equation in β1/β2 with a positive1 1
coeﬃcient for (β1/β2)3. However, since β1/β2 = βmix ∈ (1/3, 1) is a critical value yielding
both a pure-strategy equilibrium and a mixed one in subgame OC as stated in Proposition
3, it should be one of the solutions. Besides, by using Mathematica, we can conﬁrm that the
equation should have three solutions, one of which is negative and thus can be precluded for
consideration. Of the two positive solutions, β and β (β < β¯), we ﬁnd β ≈ 0.27 < 1/3, so
that we must have β = βmix, which is easily conﬁrmed by Mathematica, too. Thus in the
range of β ∈ [1/3, 3], there holds
WCC > WOCm if and only if
β1 > βmix1 1 β2
as established in the following Proposition.
Proposition 4 W1
CC > W1
OCm if and only if β1/β2 > βmix in subgame OC. Symmetrically
WCC > WCmO if and only if β2/β1 > βmix in subgame CO.2 2
Therefore at the mixed-strategy equilibrium in subgame OC, the production relocatability
of ﬁrm 2 yields the following eﬀects:
• It dampens the strategic subsidization incentive of the country liberalizing capital (coun-
try 1) and worsens its welfare.
• It strengthens the strategic subsidization incentive of the country not liberalizing capital
(country 2) and enhances its welfare.
The following intuition underlies the above results. Due to ﬁrm 2’s unilateral relocatability,
country 1 is reluctant to raise subsidy since the higher subsidy will attract ﬁrm 2 home and
19
lead the subsidization rent outﬂow to ﬁrm 2. Because of this rent outﬂow eﬀect, country 1
gets worse oﬀ and has an incentive to lower the subsidy rate. On the contrary, country 2
becomes more aggressive with the greater subsidies to earn the larger rent in trade, since the
rival country becomes weaker. 14
6 Full Equilibrium for the Capital Liberalization Game
Since subgame CO is symmetric to subgame OC, β1/β2 is constrained in the range of [1/3, 3]
in view of Lemma 2.15 To solve the ﬁrst-stage capital liberalization game, we classify the
equilibria depending on the value β1/β2 as shown in Figure 7 where Eσ1σ2 (σi ∈ {C,O})
denotes the equilibrium for subgame σ1σ2 and the subscript m to C represents that the
player having chosen C employs a mixed strategy at the subgame. 16
β1
β28 + 5
√
2
7
Type M2Type B
EOCm , ECmO
WOO1 > W
CC
1 W
OO
1 < W
CC
1
WOO2 < W
CC
2 W
OO
2 > W
CC
2
1
3
βmix
1
βmix
318− 5
√
2
2
Type M1
EOC = ECC
ECmO
ECO = ECC
EOCm
WCC2 < W
CmO
2
WCC1 > W
OCm
1 W
CC
1 < W
OCm
1
WCC2 > W
CmO
2
Figure 7: Classiﬁcation of Equilibria for the Subgames
• Type B: The subgames in which unilateral capital liberalization yields mixed-strategy
equilibria by the country closing the inward direct investment.
• Type Mi(i = 1, 2): The subgames in which country i’s unilateral capital liberalization
14We thank one anonymous referee for indicating the aggressive strategic behavior of country 2.
15Lemma 2 requires β1/β2 ≥ 1/3 for both ﬁrms to produce non-negative outputs in subgame OC. Its
counterpart for subgame OC is β2/β1 ≥ 1/3, i.e., β1/β2 ≤ 3.
16Apply Proposition 3 to subgame OC and CO. Then it is straightforward to get Figure 7. See also footnote
13 to conﬁrm βmix ∈ (1/3, 1).
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yields the same pure-strategy equilibrium as in subgame CC, while the other country
j(=6 i)’s unilateral capital liberalization yields an equilibrium with a mixed strategy
employed by country i.
The ﬁgure also summarizes welfare comparisons among possible subgame equilibria by
virtue of Propositions 2 and 4. 17 One should note that for any possible value of β1/β2, there
is at least one country which employs mixed strategies in either subgame OC or CO.
Proposition 5 For all the possible relevant values of β1/β2 ∈ [1/3, 3], there always exist
subgames of unilateral capital liberalization having mixed-strategy equilibria.
In the rest of analysis, we focus on Types M2 and Type B Equilibria.
6.1 Type M2 Equilibria
With the parameter β1/β2 ∈ (1/βmix, 3], our relevant payoﬀ matrix at the ﬁrst stage can be
shown by the following Table 4.
Table 4: 1st-Stage Payoﬀ Matrix for Type M2
Country 2
Country 1 σ1 = C
σ1 = O
σ2 = C σ2 = O
WCC1 ,W
CC
2 W
CC
1 ,W
CC
2
WOCm1 ,W
OCm
2 W
OO
1 ,W
OO
2
We demonstrate ﬁrst that C strongly dominates O for country 1. As shown in Figure 7,
when country 2 chooses C, there holds W1CC > W1
OCm . Similarly, when country 2 chooses
O, there holds W1CC > W1OO. Thus O is a dominated strategy for country 1, so that we may
delete it for consideration. As C and O are indiﬀerent to country 2 given σ1 = C, we get two
equilibria which yield the same payoﬀ: (Close, Close) and (Close, Open). 18 The resulting
payoﬀ of each country is Wi
CC for i = 1, 2.
17There holds βmix < 8−52
√
2 < 1, which is given by:
βmix − 8− 5
√
2
= 64− 45√2− 8− 5
√
2
= 60
µ
1− 17
√
2
∂
< 0.
2 2 24
The result for their reverses further implies 1/βmix > 8−5
2√
2
= 8+5
√
2 . Thus β1/β2 ∈ ( 8−5
√
2 , 8+5
√
2 ) is always7 2 7
in the range of Type B as shown in Figure 7.
18Likewise for Type M1 with β1/β2 ∈ [1/3,βmix), the equilibria are (Close, Close) and (Open, Close) yielding
the same payoﬀ.
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6.2 Type B Equilibrium
With the parameter β1/β2 ∈ (βmix, 1/βmix), the relevant payoﬀ matrix at the ﬁrst stage can
be shown by the following Table 5. As with country 1, there holds W1CC > W1
OCm against
country 2’s choice of C, while there holds W1
CmO > W1
OO 19 against country 2’s choice of
O. Thus we have established again that C is the dominant strategy for country 1. Since the
payoﬀ structure is qualitatively symmetric, C is also the dominant strategy for country 2.
Thus (Close,Close) is the dominant strategy equilibrium.
Table 5: 1st-Stage Payoﬀ Matrix for Type B
Country 2
Country 1 σ1 = C
σ1 = O
σ2 = C σ2 = O
WCC1 ,W
CC
2 W
CmO
1 ,W
CmO
2
WOCm1 ,W
OCm
2 W
OO
1 ,W
OO
2
Lastly consider the cases for either β1/β2 = βmix or β1/β2 = 1/βmix. Since the case is
symmetric, we focus our attention on the case of β1/β2 = βmix. In this case, since there holds
W1
CC = W1
OCm , C and O are indiﬀerent for country 1. But since C is still the dominant
strategy for country 2, the equilibrium is also still CC. The same logic applies to the case of
β1/β2 = 1/βmix.
In view of these results, the resulting equilibrium welfare of both countries are the same
as at the equilibrium for subgame CC.
6.3 Welfare at Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibria
In view of the above discussion, we have established
Proposition 6 At the sub-game perfect Nash equilibria of the capital liberalization game,
each country’s welfare is the same as when two exporting countries totally ban the inward
direct investment from abroad.
As we have already shown in Proposition 2, mutual capital liberalization Pareto-dominate
mutual capital restriction only when there holds β1/β2 ∈ (8−5
√
2 , 8+5
√
2). Thus unlike the2 7
19In fact, comparison between W2
OO =
β
9
2
2
in (7) and W2
OCm = (β2+9
s¯1)
2
in (14) yields W2
OCm > W2
OO where
use was made of s¯2 > 0 by virtue of (11). Symmetrically, we can also obtain W1
CmO > W1
OO.
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implication of Janeba (1998), coordination between the exporting countries will not always
be required in the capital liberalization game.
Proposition 7 In the capital liberalization game with ﬁrms’ mobility, both exporting coun-
tries need to coordinate and liberalize capital for welfare improvement only when 8−52
√
2 <
8+5
√
2β1/β2 < 7 .
For the third country, which is a country only importing the goods from Country 1 and 2, its
welfare can be expressed as:
WCC =
2(β1 + β2)2 , WOO =
(β1 + β2)2 .3 325 18
Clearly W3CC > W3OO, the third country is always worse oﬀ under mutual capital liber-
alization between the exporting countries than under their mutual capital restriction. This
is because in subgame CC, the two countries subsidize their exports and thus expand their
total sales to the third country, which means improvement of the importing country’s terms
of trade. Furthermore, the world welfare under both cases yields:
3 3X
WCC >
X
WOO.i i
i=1 i=1
The result is in a sense obvious when the two exporting ﬁrms have the same cost conditions.
For given the world social marginal cost of production, which is equal to the subsidy-exclusive
marginal cost of each ﬁrm, the exporting countries’ subsidies expand the world output, leading
to less distortion in oligopoly pricing.
When the exporting ﬁrms exhibit cost heterogeneity, de Meza (1986) shows that the
country with the more eﬃcient ﬁrm has the greater incentive to subsidize its exports. Then
coupled with the gains from the total output expansion, the world also gains from the greater
production eﬃciency, i.e., cost savings by the output expansion by the more eﬃcient ﬁrm and
the output contraction by the less eﬃcient one.
Proposition 8 The world welfare is higher under the exporting countries’ mutual capital
23
restriction than under their mutual capital liberalization.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we examine the strategic subsidy policies under a four-stage capital liberal-
ization game by endogenizing the governments’ decision on capital liberalization policy and
taking account of asymmetric cost conditions between the exporting countries.
As we have discussed, mutual capital restriction comes to be selected as a subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium. However, unlike Janeba (1998), mutual capital liberalization does
not necessarily Pareto-dominates mutual capital restriction given asymmetric cost conditions,
and furthermore the world is always better oﬀ under mutual capital restriction than under
mutual capital liberalization.
To tell the truth, as free-trade supporters, we have tried to derive mutual capital liber-
alization as an equilibrium and a better outcome for the world, but in vain. It is our future
task to ﬁnd out what additional factors are necessary to advocate capital liberalization in
imperfect competition.
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